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Abstract—Simple stochastic games are turn-based 2½-player
games with a reachability objective. The basic question asks
whether player Max can win a given game with at least a given
probability. A natural extension are games with a conjunction of
such conditions as objective. Despite a plethora of recent results
on analysis of systems with multiple objectives, decidability of
this basic problem remains open. In this paper, we show the
Pareto frontier of the achievable values can be approximated to
a given precision. In particular, our algorithm is not limited to
stopping games and can be run as an anytime algorithm, always
returning the current approximation and its error bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
Simple stochastic games [Con92] are zero-sum turn-based
stochastic games (SG) where the objective of player Maxi-
mizer is to maximize the probability of reaching a given target
set of states, while player Minimizer aims at the opposite.
The basic decision problem is to determine whether there
is a strategy for Max achieving at least a given probability
threshold. These games are interesting both theoretically: the
problem is known to be in NP∩ co-NP, but not known to be
in P, and several other important game problems reduce to it
[CF11] such as parity games; as well as practically: they can
serve as a tool for synthesis with safety/co-safety objectives
in environments with stochastic uncertainty.
Multi-objective stochastic systems have attracted a lot of
attention recently, see below, both SG and the special case with
one player only (Markov decision processes, MDP [Put14]).
They model and enable optimization with respect to conflicting
goals, where a desired trade-off is to be considered. A natural
multi-dimensional generalization of the reachability threshold
constraint P[♦T ] ≥ t is a conjunction ∧i P[♦Ti] ≥ ti giv-
ing rise to generalized-reachability (or multiple-reachability)
stochastic games, similarly to e.g. generalized mean-payoff SG
[BKTW15], [CD16]. The problem is then to decide whether
a given vector of thresholds can be achieved by Maximizer.
Note that since these games are not determined [CFK+13b]
this corresponds to the lower-value problem.
While in the single-dimensional case reachability is com-
parably simple objective, e.g. a special case of mean payoff
since the target states can be made absorbing, it is not the
case for the multi-dimensional case. Firstly, while generalized
mean-payoff MDP can be solved in P [Cha07], [BBC+14],
generalized reachability MDP are PSPACE-hard [RRS15].
Secondly, while generalized mean-payoff SG have been solved
[BKTW15], [CD16], generalized reachability SG are still
open. Decidability is shown for the (more general) total-reward
objective, but only for the subclass of stopping SG with a 2-
dimensional objective [BF16]. (An SG is stopping if under any
strategies a designated set of sinks is reached almost surely.)
In this paper, we show the following:
Theorem: ε-approximation of the set of all achiev-
able vectors in any SG (not necessarily stopping)
with generalized-reachability objective of any di-
mension is effectively constructible for any given
ε > 0.
Our algorithm provides anytime bounds on the Pareto frontier
and the bounds converge in the limit to the frontier. Thus
we strengthen the result of [CFK+13b], which provides a
converging sequence of lower bounds on the frontier. Our
complementary upper bounds allow us to approximate the
frontier with any given precision, i.e., report the current
precision in the case of the anytime approximation.
Convergent upper bounds on the value are notoriously
known to be difficult to achieve. Until recently, the default
engine for analysis in the most used probabilistic model
checker Prism [KNP11] and Prism-Games [CFK+13a] used
value iteration, e.g. [Put14], which converges to the value from
below and the stopping criteria used could render arbitrarily
wrong results [HM17]. For a solution with a given precision,
one could use linear programing instead, which however,
does not scale well for MDP, e.g. [KM17], and does not
work at all for SG [Con92]. Therefore, [BCC+14], [HM17]
extended value iteration so that it provides not only the
under-approximating convergent sequence, but also an over-
approximating one, calling the technique “bounded value iter-
ation” (due to [MLG05]) or “interval iteration”, respectively.
Its essence is to collapse maximal end components (MECs) of
the MDP; on an MDP without MECs the over-approximating
sequence also converges to the actual value of the (modi-
fied as well as original) MDP. This technique was further
extended to MDP with mean-payoff objective [ACD+17].
In contrast, for SG one cannot collapse MECs since they
account for non-trivial alternating structure, as opposed to
MDP, where any desired action exiting the MEC can be
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taken almost surely. Therefore, a more complex procedure
has been proposed for SG [KKKW18]: Depending on the
current under-approximation, problematic parts of MECs are
dynamically identified and their over-approximation is lowered
to over-approximations of certain actions exiting the MEC, as
exemplified and explained in Section III.
This paper utilizes several techniques from literature to
obtain the corresponding result for the multi-dimensional case:
• Firstly, we use the Bellman operator extended to
downward-closed sets (instead of just real values)
[CFK+13b], allowing for value iteration in the multi-
dimensional setting.
• Secondly, we exploit the technique of [KKKW18], which
in the single-dimensional setting repetitively identifies the
problematic parts of MECs preventing convergence.
• Thirdly, in order to apply this technique, we view our
problem as a continuum of single-dimensional problems
due to [FKP12].
• Fourthly, we group the single-dimensional problems into
finitely many regions, in spirit similar to regions of
timed automata [AD94] since they are essentially given
by orderings of the approximate values of certain ac-
tions. Nevertheless, due to the projective geometry of the
problem, we need to work slightly more generally with
simplicial complexes, e.g. [Hat02].
The main technical difficulty is to identify (i) the parts of
MECs with an unjustified too high upper bound and (ii) the
value to which it should be decreased in each step, both
relative to different real-valued weights put on the objectives,
which are, moreover, uncountably many.
Related work. Already for a decade, MDP have been
extensively studied in the setting of multiple objectives. Mul-
tiple objectives have been considered both qualitative, such
as reachability and LTL [EKVY08], as well as quantita-
tive, such as mean payoff [Cha07], [BBC+14], discounted
sum [CFW13], or total reward [FKN+11]. The expecta-
tion has been combined with variance in [BCFK13]. Beside
expectation queries, conjunctions of percentile (threshold)
queries have been considered for various objectives [FKR95],
[BBC+14], [RRS17], [CKK17]. Further, for general Boolean
combinations for Markov chains with total reward, [HKL17]
approximates the value, while computability is still open.
In contrast, [Vel15] shows that Boolean combinations over
mean payoff games become quickly undecidable. For the
specifics of the two-dimensional case and their interplay,
see [BDD+14]. The usage of the multi-dimensional setting
is discussed in [BDK+14b], [BDK14a], comparing multiple
rewards and quantiles and reporting how they have practically
been applied and found useful by domain experts.
More recently, SG have been also analyzed with multiple
objectives, but the results are more limited [SK16]. Multiple
mean-payoff objective was first examined in [BKTW15] and
both the qualitative and the quantitative problems are coNP-
complete [CD16]. Although Boolean combinations of mean-
payoff are undecidable in general [Vel15], in certain subclasses
of SG they can be approximated [BKW18]. Boolean combina-
tions of total-reward objectives was approximated in the case
of stopping games [CFK+13b] and applied to autonomous
driving [CKSW13], where LTL is reduced to total reward in
the case of stopping games. For dimension two, the problem
is shown decidable [BF16].
While Prism-Games [KPW16] provides tool support for sev-
eral multi-player multi-objective settings [KPW18], the single-
dimensional-focused tools GAVS+ [CKLB11] and GIST
[CHJR10] are not maintained any more. MultiGain [BCFK15]
is limited to generalized mean-payoff SG.
Pareto frontiers can be in many settings ε-approximated
in polynomial time [PY00]. Pareto frontiers are constructed
for generalized mean-payoff objective for 2-player (non-
stochastic) games in [BR15], MDP in [BBC+14], [CKK17],
and SG in [BKW18]. For the generalized-reachability, the
Pareto frontier is approximated for MDP in [EKVY08], but
for SG the Pareto frontier is not even known to be given
by finitely many points, except for dimension two [BF16].
In contrast, in the single-dimensional case, the value is known
to be a multiple of a denominator that can be easily calculated
from the syntactic description of the game [CH08].
Structure of the paper After recalling the basic notions
and the gist of the technique of [KKKW18] in Section II,
we illustrate the problem, the difficulties and our solution on
examples in Section III. The algorithm is described and the
correctness intuitively explained in Section IV. The high-level
proof follows in Section V, relaying all technical proofs of
claims, for the sake of readability, to Section VI. We conclude
in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Stochastic Games
A probability distribution on a finite set X is a mapping
δ : X → [0, 1], such that ∑x∈X δ(x) = 1. The set of all
probability distributions on X is denoted by D(X). Given a
dimension n ∈ N, often implicitly clear from context, and
c ∈ R, we let ~c denote the n-dimensional vector with all
components equal to c. For a vector ~v, its ith component is
denoted ~vi. We compare vectors component-wise, i.e. ~u ≤ ~v
if ~ui ≤ ~vi for all i.
Now we define turn-based two-player stochastic games. As
opposed to the notation of e.g. [Con92], we do not have special
stochastic nodes, but rather a probabilistic transition function.
Definition 1 (SG): A stochastic game (SG) is a tuple
(S ,S,S©, s0,A,Av, δ), where S is a finite set of states
partitioned into the sets S and S© of states of the player
Maximizer and Minimizer, respectively, s0 ∈ S is the initial
state, A is a finite set of actions, Av : S → 2A assigns to every
state a set of available actions, and δ : S × A → D(S ) is a
transition function that given a state s and an action a ∈ Av(s)
yields a probability distribution over successor states.
A Markov decision process (MDP) is then a special case of
SG where S© = ∅. Note that a Markov chain (MC) can be
also seen as a special case of an MDP, where for all s ∈ S :
|Av(s)| = 1. We assume that SG are non-blocking, so for all
states s we have Av(s) 6= ∅.
For a state s and an available action a ∈ Av(s), we denote
the set of successors by Post(s, a) := {s′ | δ(s, a, s′) > 0}. We
say a state-action pair (s, a) is an exit of a set of states T , writ-
ten (s, a) exits T , if ∃t ∈ Post(s, a) : t /∈ T , i.e., if with some
probability a successor outside of T could be chosen. Further,
we use Ex(T ) = {(s, a) | s ∈ T, a ∈ Av(s), (s, a) exits T}
to denote all exits of a state set T ⊆ S . Finally, for any set
of states T ⊆ S , we use T and T© to denote the states of
T that belong to Maximizer and Minimizer, whose states are
drawn in the figures as  and ©, respectively.
The semantics of SG is given in the usual way by means
of strategies and the induced Markov chain [BK08] and its
respective probability space, as follows. An infinite path ρ is
an infinite sequence ρ = s0a0s1a1 · · · ∈ (S × A)ω , such that
for every i ∈ N, ai ∈ Av(si) and si+1 ∈ Post(si, ai). Finite
paths are defined analogously as elements of (S × A)∗ × S .
A strategy of Maximizer or Minimizer is a function σ :
(S × A)∗ × S → D(A) or (S × A)∗ × S© → D(A),
respectively, such that σ(s) ∈ D(Av(s)) for all s. We call a
strategy deterministic if it maps to Dirac distributions only;
otherwise, it is randomizing. A pair (σ, τ) of strategies of
Maximizer and Minimizer induces a Markov chain Gσ,τ with
finite paths as states, s0 being initial, and the transition function
δ(ws,wsas′) =
∑
a∈Av(s) σ(ws)(a) · δ(s, a, s′) for states of
Maximizer and analogously for states of Minimizer, with σ
replaced by τ . The Markov chain induces a unique probability
distribution Pσ,τ over measurable sets of infinite paths [BK08,
Ch. 10].
B. End Components
Now we recall a fundamental tool for analysis of MDP
called end components. An end component of a SG is then
defined as the end component of the underlying MDP with
both players unified.
Definition 2 (EC): A non-empty set T ⊆ S of states is
an end component (EC) if there is a non-empty set B ⊆⋃
s∈T Av(s) of actions such that
1) for each s ∈ T, a ∈ B ∩ Av(s), we have (s, a) /∈ Ex(T ),
2) for each s, s′ ∈ T there is a finite path w = sa0 . . . ans′ ∈
(T ×B)∗× T , i.e. the path stays inside T and only uses
actions in B.
Intuitively, ECs correspond to bottom strongly connected com-
ponents of the Markov chains induced by possible strategies.
Hence for some pair of strategies all possible paths starting in
an EC remain there. An EC T is a maximal end component
(MEC) if there is no other end component T ′ such that T ⊆ T ′.
Given an SG G, the set of its MECs is denoted by MEC(G)
and can be computed in polynomial time [CY95].
C. Generalized Reachability
For a set T ⊆ S , we write ♦T := {inf. path s0a0s1a1 . . . |
∃i ∈ N : si ∈ T} to denote the (measurable) set of all paths
which eventually reach T . A generalized-reachability objective
(of dimension n) is an n-tuple T = (T1, . . . , Tn) of state sets
Ti ⊆ S . A vector ~v (of dimension n) is achievable if there
is a strategy σ of Maximizer such that for all strategies τ of
Minimizer
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} Pσ,τ (♦Ti) ≥ ~vi
Note that this corresponds to the lower value only since these
games are not determined [CFK+13b].
For a given state s, the set of points achievable from s,
meaning in a game where the initial state is set to s, is
denoted AT (s) or just A(s) when T is clear from context.
We abbreviate A(s0) to A.
D. Basic Geometry Notation and Pareto Frontiers
In order to consider convex combinations of sets, we define
scaling of a set X by a constant c ∈ [0, 1] as c · X = {c ·
x | x ∈ X}, and the Minkowski sum of sets X and Y as
X + Y = {x + y | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y }. The convex hull of a set
X is denoted by conv(X) = {∑ki=1 aixi | k ∈ N,∀i : xi ∈
X, ai ≥ 0,
∑k
i=1 ai = 1}.
A downward closure of a set X of vectors is dwc(X) :=
{y | ∃x ∈ X : y ≤ x}. A set X is downward closed if X =
dwc(X). The set A of achievable points is clearly downward
closed.
It will be convenient to use a few basic notions of projective
geometry, which we now recall. A direction is a line through
origin ~0; we may represent it with any vector ~v on that line; all
vectors λ·~v for any λ ∈ R\{0} are equivalent and represent the
same direction. For instance, direction d = [(1, 0, 0)] denotes
the x-axis and it holds d = [(λ, 0, 0)] for any λ 6= 0.
The natural basis of Rn consists of unit vectors ~e i pointing
in the direction of axes, i.e. each ~e i is given by Kronecker
delta as ~e ij = 1 for i = j and 0 otherwise. We define
the set D of main directions as convex combinations of the
directions [~e i] given by natural basis vectors. Intuitively, these
are all directions in the first quadrant (generalized to higher
dimensions).
Given a set X of vectors and a direction d, X evaluated
in direction d is the (Euclidean) length of the vector from
the origin to the farthermost intersection of X and d, denoted
X[d] := sup{||~x|| | ~x ∈ X,d = [~x]} . Fig. 1 illustrates
an evaluation of a direction on an achievable set. Intuitively,
it describes what is achievable if we prefer the dimensions in
the “ratio” given by d. Another example is the whole blue-red
set of Fig. 4a: evaluated in [(1, 1)] it yields
√
2/2.
Given a downward closed set X , its Pareto frontier is the
set of farthermost points in each direction:
P(X) = {~x | d ∈ D,d = [~x], X[d] = ||x||}
The Pareto frontier of a state s is the Pareto front of the set
achievable in s, i.e. P(s) := P(A(s)). The Pareto set of the
game is P := P(s0). Clearly, P = P(A) and A = dwc(P).
1
1Our notion of Pareto frontier captures the whole surface in the first quad-
rant. Other definitions such as PT = {~v | ~v is achievable ∧∀ achievable ~u :
~u 6> ~v} only capture the Pareto optimal points. For example, if the set of
achievable points in the three-dimensional space is the whole unit cube then
our definition returns its three sides, while the definition above returns only
the singleton with the Pareto optimal point (1, 1, 1).
d
X
1
1
Figure 1: Example showing a Pareto frontier of a set X , a direction
d, and the point of intersection of d with the frontier, depicted as
in distance X[d] from the origin.
E. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we are interested in ε-approximating P. In
terms of lower and upper bounds:
Given an SG, generalized-reachability objective T , and
precision ε > 0, the task is to construct sets L,U ⊆ Rn
such that for each direction d ∈ D, L[d] and U [d] are
effectively computable and we have
L[d] ≤ P[d] ≤ U [d] and U [d]− L[d] < ε .
F. Multi-dimensional and Bounded Value Iteration
In this section we recall two extensions of the standard
value iteration: a generalization for multi-dimensional ob-
jectives and a “bounded” one with an over-approximating
sequence. Firstly, the multi-dimensional Bellman operator for
reachability, e.g. [CFK+13b],
B :
(
S ∪ S×A → 2Rn)→ (S ∪ S×A → 2Rn)
works with sets X(s) and X(s, a) of points (achievable in s,
or in s using a now, respectively) rather than single points:
B(X)(s) =
{ ⋂
a∈Av(s)X(s, a) if s ∈ S©
conv(
⋃
a∈Av(s)X(s, a)) if s ∈ S
B(X)(s, a) =
dwc({1T (s)}) + ∑
s′∈S
δ(s, a, s′) ·X(s′)
∩1
where 1T is the indicator vector function of target sets, i.e.
1T (s)i equals 1 if s ∈ Ti and 0 otherwise, and 1 = {~v | ∀i :
~vi ∈ [0, 1]} is the unit box.
Intuitively, the operator works as follows. Given what can
be achieved from s using now an action a, we can compute
the value for the minimizing state as the intersection over
all actions since these points are achievable no matter what
Minimizer does. For maximizing states, if there exists an
action achieving a point then Maximizer can achieve it from
here; moreover, we compute the convex hull since Maximizer
can also randomize and, as opposed to the minimizing case
with intersection, union of convex sets need not be convex.
Once we have dealt with decision making on the first line, it
remains to determine what can be achieved by each decision,
on the second line. The achievable values are given by the
weighted average of the successors’ values, but additionally,
the base case of targets must be handled. Namely, whenever
s1
s2
s3
α
β
γ
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
Figure 2: An example demonstrating the complications arising in an
end component.
a state is in a target set, all values up to 1 in that dimension
are achievable (but not greater than 1).
This also gives rise to an algorithm approximating P, which
is the least fixpoint of B [CFK+13b]. We initialize L : S ∪
S × A → 2Rn to return {~0} everywhere, iteratively apply the
Bellman operator, and then limk→∞Bk(L) = A = dwc(P)
[CFK+13b]. Moreover, the set is effectively presented at each
step as a finite set P of points on the Pareto frontier that
generate it, the set is computable as dwc(conv(P)).
However, it is not known how to bound the difference
of the actual achievable set A and the approximation after
k iterations. For that reason, [KKKW18] introduced for the
single-dimensional case the bounded value iteration (named
along the tradition of [MLG05]), a way to compute also an
over-approximating sequence. If we initialize U to return ~1 ev-
erywhere, then limk→∞Bk(U) is the greatest fixpoint, which
is generally different from the least one. Hence [KKKW18]
modifies B so that it has a single fixpoint equal to the least
one of the original B. Then both the sequence of lower bounds
and of upper bounds converge to P, the value of the game.
The modification is demonstrated in the next section, where
we also illustrate the main ideas how to cope with the multi-
dimensional case.
III. EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate the issues preventing conver-
gence of the upper bounds and our solution on examples. All
the problems are rooted in end components. Consider the EC
in Fig. 2 with states s1, s2, s3 and actions a, . . . , g. We start
with considering a single reachability objective. Suppose the
lower and upper bound functions have already converged for
the states outside of this EC to their true value, as depicted in
the picture, e.g. for (s1, e) it is γ.
Since we are considering the single reachability objective,
the standard Bellman update procedure [Put14] reduces to the
following equations, where intersections become minima and
unions become maxima. We write Bk(U) as Uk for short.
Ui+1(s1) = min {Ui(s2),Ui(s3), γ}
Ui+1(s2) = max {Ui(s1), α}
Ui+1(s3) = max {Ui(s1), β}
Recall that we initialize L0 to return 0 everywhere and U0 to
return 1 everywhere.
A. MDP
Firstly, let us briefly mention the solution of [BCC+14],
[HM17] for MDP. In a maximizing MDP the first min would
also be max and the initialization U0 = ~1 is actually already a
fixpoint, although the actual value is max{α, β, γ}. Intuitively,
the reason for this is that the equations set the dependencies of
the values in a circular way, the process of finding the value
by “asking neighbours” is not well-founded, and all states live
in an illusion about a higher value (1). Since the illusion is
generally shared it is a consistent model of the constraints. The
solution is to detect this is an EC, collapse it, eliminating the
circularity. We only keep the outgoing actions α, β, γ and in
the next iteration, the Bellman operator sets the value correctly
to max{α, β, γ}, converging to the true value.
B. Single-reachability SG
Secondly, for single-reachability SG, the EC cannot in
general be collapsed since the values of the states differ, as
can be seen in the following case distinction:
Case 1: If γ < min(α, β), then after the first iteration we
have U1(s1) = γ, U1(s2) = 1 and U1(s3) = 1. After the next
iteration, U2(s1) = γ, U2(s2) = α and U2(s3) = β, which are
the actual values. In this case thus Uk converges to the value.
However, note that the values of the states in the same EC are
different.
Case 2: If γ ≥ min(α, β), and say α > β, so the values
of s1 and s3 are β and that of s2 is α. However, Uk does not
converge to this. In the first iteration, U1(s1) = γ, U1(s2) = 1
and U1(s3) = 1. After the next iteration, U2(s1) = U2(s3) =
γ. After this, the upper bounds do not change, although the
values of s1 and s3 are β, which is smaller than γ.
In this case thus Uk does not converge to the actual value.
The EC is “bloated” [KKKW18], having unjustified large
(bloated) value, which needs to be explicitly “deflated”. If
we fix the strategy of the Minimizer to c as it is its best
choice, only s1 and s3 form an EC. If we collapsed this EC, we
would correctly update the value to β. Hence the “deflating”
subprocedure of the new Bellman operator imagines what if
collapse happened on this subEC2 and updates the values
correspondingly. To obtain an algorithm, this collapsing must
be only imaginary since we cannot say for sure what to
collapse. Indeed, in the case with α < β, a different EC
({s1, s2}) should be collapsed and if α = β then all three states
should be collapsed. Since during the approximation process
we only have approximations (Li) of the actual values, we do
not know which of the cases it is and which EC is finally to be
collapsed. Our guesses may change over time and we might
learn the truth only in the limit. Hence we only pretend the
collapse for the one-step computation and deflate only to what
is for sure a current safe upper bound.
C. Generalized-reachability SG
Here we intuitively describe and illustrate the main elements
of our solution.
2A subEC of an EC E is an EC contained in E.
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Figure 3: Pareto sets of α (left), β (center) and γ (right) in a 2-
objective setting. X-axis represents the value along the first objective
and Y-axis represents the value along the second objective.
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Figure 4: (a) Visualizing the regions; and (b) the result of deflating
the regions in direction d2.
Regions. In the multi-dimensional case, instead of α, β and
γ being reals, assume they are achievable sets as given in
Fig. 3. Here γ gives the highest values, so it is the best
one for Maximizer, so Minimizer will not play it. Depending
on the trade-off that Maximizer wants to achieve, α or β
might be better than the other. To this end, let d be the
direction in which Maximizer wants to maximize. Depending
on d, Minimizer’s behaviour changes. If the objective along
the x-axis is more important, then Minimizer chooses action
c. If on the other hand, the objective along y-axis is more
important, then the Minimizer chooses action a. Our algorithm
identifies finitely many regions where the Minimizer has the
same preferences for actions and then we deflate each region
separately. In our example, we can identify three regions, as
shown in Fig. 4a. Between the directions d1 and d2 ( region),
Minimizer’s best choice is action a; between d2 and d3 (
region), Minimizer’s best choice is action c; and along d2 (
line), both have the same preference.
Once the region fixes the preferences of Minimizer’s ac-
tions, we can (virtually) drop some of Minimizer’s actions,
identify areas which Minimizer does not want to leave and
consider what happens within this simpler area.
Deflating subECs. In order to improve the upper bounds,
we introduce the set of “cooperatively” achievable vectors for
a state set T as
Acoop(T ) :=
∑
s∈T
dwc({1T (s)}) + conv(
⋃
(s,a)∈Ex(T)
A(s, a))
 ∩ 1
The first summand contains the vectors that are possibly
achievable by staying only in T . The second summand con-
1
0.5 1
1.5
0.5
1
(a) Three sets of achiev-
able points
[1,0,0][0,1,0]
[0,0,1]
[0.5,0,0.5]
(b) Projection of the
intersections into re-
gions
(c) Convex regions
as a simplicial com-
plex
Figure 5: Projections of intersections of sets to the projective
plane, which we depict in 3D as the triangle between the points
λ~e 1, λ~e 2, λ~e 3 for some λ 6= 0.
tains the vectors that are achievable by taking any desired
combination of exits of Maximizer.3
Intuitively, Acoop(T ) contains all vectors that are achievable
if Minimizer decides to let Maximizer roam around in T freely
as he likes, visit all targets in T and pick any randomization
over all of Maximizer’s exits. In other words, it is as if
we collapsed the whole T in to one Maximizer’s state. Of
course, such cooperative behaviour yields an unrealistic over-
approximation. However, it is not only the best approximation
we can give without in-depth graph analysis, but also a key
to the whole solution. Indeed, for each region and each
corresponding MEC, we identify subECs, called simple (SEC),
where the Minimizer does not have any choice, but cooperate
unless it wants to exit the area at the cost of increasing the
value. In a SEC T , Ucoop(T ) thus provides a tight upper
bound, given the current knowledge (here Ucoop(T ) replaces
application of A by its current over-approximation U in
Acoop(T )). This is illustrated in Fig. 4b. Once these SECs
are handled, Minimizer’s states outside of SECs can choose
in which SECs to steer the game (based on the updated value)
without circular dependencies (for that particular region). Thus
deflating SECs provides enough information to proceed with
the value iteration with the standard Bellman operator in the
next step.
Computing and representing regions. As explained above,
a region is given by the order of preference of actions. We
can depict the achievable set of each action as in Fig. 4a, one
given by dwc({(0.5, 0.9)}), the other by dwc({(0.9, 0.5)}).
Points where their boundaries intersect represent the turning
points of the preference. In this picture it is the point (0.5, 0.5).
When projected to the projective plane, the projections of
the intersections yield a partitioning of the projective plane
into different regions. In this case, it is the two lines and the
point in between, see Fig. 4a. Another example is depicted in
Fig. 5 with three achievable sets: two rectangles and one line
segment. The fronts of the sets generate only one intersection
(namely, of the two 2-dimensional sets4), which is the point
3We assume the empty union equals {~0} since that is the neutral element
for achievable sets.
4The neutral element {~0} is not considered a non-empty intersection.
[0, 1, 0] [1, 0, 0]
[0, 0, 1]
[0, 1, 0] [1, 0, 0]
[0, 0, 1]
[0, 1, 0] [1, 0, 0]
[0, 0, 1]
Figure 6: Projection examples: boundary on the left, its projection on
the right, generating 3 not necessarily convex and connected regions
(the inner triangle, its boundary, the outer triangle with the hole
(0.5, 0, 0.5), see Fig. 5a. This results in distinguishing 4
different regions, as shown in Fig. 5b. Firstly, there is the
region that contains everything but the right side (marked as
thick) of the triangle. This side of the triangle is divided into
the other 3 regions like in Fig. 4a.
In order to keep the representation of regions effective,
we triangulate regions into finer ones, which are convex
and generated by finitely many points, see Fig. 5c. Since
a region is given by the ordering of actions, it bears some
resemblance to regions of timed automata [AD94]. In par-
ticular, the boundaries of regions are also separate regions,
corresponding to equal preferences, see the the thin region
(just d2) in Fig. 4a or the single direction in Fig. 5. Instead
of each simplex we consider only its interior (considering
its self as a topology), hence we have open triangles, open
line segments and points. To this end, we represent them as
simplicial complexes [Hat02], see next section.
Further examples are illustrated in Fig. 6. In each of them
one set is the tetrahedron (generated by Maximizer’s free,
but exclusive choice between target sets). The other one
is a box of different sizes (generated by the possibility to
reach with a given probability a state in all target sets). As
Figure 7: Triangulation of the top right of Fig. 6
Algorithm 1 Bounded Value Iteration
Input: SG G, generalized-reachability objective T , precision 
Output: L,U : ∀d ∈ D : L[d] ≤ P[d] ≤ U [d],U [d]− L[d] < ε
1: procedure BVI
2: for each s ∈ S do . Initialization
3: L(s)← {~0} . to the least and
4: U(s)← dwc({~1}) . the greatest values
5: repeat . The new Bellman update B
6: L ← B(L) . Standard Bellman updates
7: U ← B(U)
8: U ← DEFLATE SECs(G, L,U) . New treatment
9: until max
d∈D
U(s0)[d]− L(s0)[d] < ε . ε-approximate
10: return frontier(L), frontier(U)
this probability varies, the box “rises” above the tetrahedron
(like a floating object above the water surface), producing
different intersection. While some of those, e.g. the third one,
may be convex, others are not and must be triangulated. A
triangulation of the second one can be found in Fig. 7.
Such finitely-generated regions enable effective grouping of
“equivalent” single-dimensional optimization queries.
IV. ALGORITHM
We have seen in the example that it is important to split
the set of all possible directions D into regions. Moreover,
for effectiveness reasons, we restrict ourselves to finitely-
generated convex ones.
Definition 3 (Region): A region R ⊆ D is a set of
directions such that there are k ∈ N,d1, . . . ,dk ∈ D so that
R = conv(d1, . . . ,dk).
A region thus corresponds to a finitely generated cone, i.e.,
origin connected to a polygon (prolonged to infinity). In the
following we also view the region as the set of points it
contains.
We use this concept to generalize the notion of simple end
component (SEC) of [KKKW18]. Intuitively, an EC is simple,
if Minimizer’s best choice is to let Maximizer roam around
freely in the EC and pick any combination of Maximizer’s
exits. Minimizer cannot thus influence the value of the states
in this EC, hence all states have the same value, namely
Acoop(T ). Hence, intuitively, we can find SECs by removing
all but the best (i.e. least-valued) choices of Minimizer. If in
the remaining game there still exists an EC, then Minimizer
cannot change the value of any state in that EC, because it is
Algorithm 2 DEFLATE SECs
1: procedure DEFLATE SECs(L,U) . In each MEC, we
compute relevant regions, find all respective SECs and
decrease their upper bounds
2: M← MEC(G) . MEC decomposition of the game
3: for each T ∈M do
4: R ← GET REGIONS(T, L)
5: for each R ∈ R do
6: S ← FIND SECs(T, L, R)
7: for each C ∈ S do
8: for each s ∈ C do . Deflate s on R
9: redefine U(s) on R to be U(s) ∩ Ucoop(C)
10: return U
its best action to play like this, and all states have the same
value.
Definition 4 (SEC): An EC T is simple, written SEC, for
some region R, if for every direction d ∈ R and all states
s, t ∈ T , A(s)[d] = A(t)[d].
As we saw in the examples, in the presence of SECs the
over-approximation must be additionally decreased. So the
idea of Algorithm 1 is to not only iteratively apply the standard
Bellman updates, but to additionally deflate the (bloated)
SECs.5 Note that Algorithm 1 now has a convergence criterion.
This is effective since L and U are at any moment given as
values for finitely many regions.
Algorithm 2 shows how SECs are treated. It first computes
the MEC decomposition, because every SEC is an EC and
hence part of a MEC. Then, for every MEC it computes the
relevant regions as in the examples, see Section III. The invari-
ant for each of the computed regions is, that for all directions
inside this region Minimizer has the same preferences over
the possible Maximizer exits. Thus, SECs are well-defined for
these regions (and can be computed) since a SEC for one
direction in a region is also a SEC for all directions in this
region.
Since all states in a SEC T have the same value, namely
Acoop(T ), we can set the upper bound of all states in T safely
to Ucoop(T ), which is the smallest over-approximation possible
at the moment. Algorithm 2 deflates the upper bound region
by region. It only updates the estimate of single regions and
only for states in SEC for this region, see line 9. It also makes
sure not to increase the value, so that the sequence of upper
bounds stays monotonic.
In order to identify all the regions, we use the simplicial
complexes, e.g. [Hat02]. We recall the formal definitions:
A (k−)simplex is a (k-dimensional) polytope given as the
convex hull of k+1 affinely independent vertices. A simplicial
complex (SC) is a set of simplices closed under taking faces
and such that the intersection of any its two simplices is a face
of both.
5Actually, we deflate what we currently believe are SECs based on the
current approximations, which is proven safe in the subsequent sections.
Algorithm 3 GET REGIONS
1: procedure GET REGIONS(T ⊆ S , L)
2: P ← SC generated by D on the projective hyperplane
3: for s1, s2 ∈ Ex(T) do
4: I ← frontier(L(s1)) ∩ frontier(L(s2))
5: PI ← SC generated by the projected I
6: P ← common refinement of P and PI
7: return {self-interior(s) | s ∈ P}
Algorithm 4 FIND SECs
1: procedure FIND SECs(T ⊆ S , L, region R)
2: d← arbitrary element of R
3: B ← {(s, {a ∈ Av(s) | L(s, a)[d] > L(s)[d]}) | s ∈ T©}
. Minimizer’s suboptimal actions w.r.t. L and d
4: Av′ ← Av \B . Keep optimal actions only
5: return MEC(T |Av′) . MEC decomposition on T
with actions restricted to Av′
Intuitively, a simplex is a point, line segment, triangle, tetra-
hedron etc. A simplical complex is like a drawing consisting
of these elements ensuring that all lower dimensional parts
of a drawing (e.g. line as a part of a triangle) is also in the
collection.
Given SCs C1, C2, we can create an SC C such that any
s ∈ C1∪C2 is a finite union of elements of C [Hat02]. We call
C a common refinement. This essentially involves triangulation
in higher dimensions.
Algorithm 3 makes use of this as it gradually draws the pic-
ture on the projective hyperplane, as illustrated in Section III.
It starts with the “generalized first quadrant”, e.g. in 3D the
big triangles depicted in Figures 5, 6, 7. Then we draw all the
intersections of all the frontiers. In each step we make sure by
the refinement that the current areas are convex. Finally, as in
timed automata, we need to return the interiors of the areas
since the boundaries indicate equality of preference of actions.
This is formally done by taking what we call self-interior(s),
the interior of s in the topology defined by s; e.g. the interior
of a line segment in 3D is empty, but within the line-segment
its interior is itself without the end-points.
Finally, Algorithm 4 FIND SECs is exactly as in
[KKKW18], except that we first need to fix a direction to
eliminate trade-offs and get a clear notion of an action being
better than another one.
V. CORRECTNESS PROOF
Our Bellman operator B is a higher order operator trans-
forming pairs of the estimate functions: the two estimate
functions L,U ∈ (S ∪ S × A) → 2[0,1]n for the under-/over-
approximation are transformed into a pair with the modified
under- and over-approximation. It can thus be seen as
B :
(
(S ∪ (S × A))→ 2[0,1]n × 2[0,1]n
)
→(
(S ∪ (S × A))→ 2[0,1]n × 2[0,1]n
)
For the next two sections, we fix an SG G =
(S ,S,S©, s0,A,Av, δ) and a generalized-reachability objec-
tive T and implicitly use them as parameters of B. Note
that for all states s ∈ S , U0(s) = ~1 respectively L0(s) = ~0
are set by the initialization, while U0(s, a) and L0(s, a) are
undefined. The latter is not a problem, because for every
positive number i, Li(s, a) (similarly for U) is implicitly
computed from Li−1(s, a) and hence U0(s, a) and L0(s, a) are
not needed.
We are interested in the properties of the following se-
quence: For all i ∈ N, let (Li,Ui) = B
i
(L0,U0). We use
the abbreviations L∞ := limi→∞ Li and U∞ := limi→∞ Ui.
Proposition 1: Soundness
Algorithm 1 computes for each state s ∈ S monotonic over-
and under-approximations of A(s), i.e. ∀i ∈ N : Li(s) ≤
A(s) ≤ Ui(s) and for i < j, Li(s) ≤ Lj(s) as well as Ui(s) ≥
Uj(s).
Proposition 2: Convergence from below
For all states s ∈ S : L∞(s) = A(s).
Proposition 3: Convergence from above
For all states s ∈ S : U∞(s) = A(s).
Note that for all directions d and for all s ∈ S by definition
A(s)[d] = P(s)[d]. Using this and the three propositions, we
can prove the main theorem.
Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 computes convergent monotonic
over- and under-approximations of P(s) for each s ∈ S . Since
it is convergent, for every  > 0 there exists an i, such that for
every s ∈ S and direction d ∈ Rn : Ui(s)[d] − Li(s)[d] < .
So by instantiating s with s0, we solve the problem posed in
Section II-E.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2: Note that for all i ∈
N it holds that Li = Bi(L0), since DEFLATE SECs does
not change the under-approximation. [BKW18, Proposition 8]
proves that B is order-preserving, i.e. monotonic, and that
it converges to the unique least fixpoint A when repeatedly
applied to the bottom element of a complete partial order.
The least possible lower bound assigns ~0 to all S , since there
is no smaller vector that can be assigned to a state. This is
exactly the definition of L0, which implies that for all s ∈ S ,
L∞ = A(s). This proves Proposition 2.
For the the soundness of the over-approximation we re-
quire that the additional operation performed by B, namely
DEFLATE SECs, is sound and monotonic. This is proven in
Section VI-A in Lemmata 5 and 6, respectively. From this and
the fact that B is order-preserving, we can deduce Proposition
1.
Proof of Proposition 3: Note that U∞ =
limi→∞B
i
(U0). It is proven in Lemma 7 in Section
VI-B that B is a continuous operator. From this we get
that B(U∞) = U∞. We will use this statement to derive a
contradiction, i.e. we will now assume that there is a state
s ∈ S such that U∞(s) 6= A(s) and derive from this that
B(U∞) < U∞. In other words, applying the loop once more
decreases the over-approximation.
1) Assume for contradiction, that ∃t ∈ S : U∞(t) 6= A(t).
Hence from Proposition 1 it follows that U∞(t) > A(t).
Thus, we can fix a state t and a direction d, s.t.
U∞(t)[d] > A(t)[d].
2) Let X := {s | s ∈ S ∧ ∆(s) = maxs∈S ∆(s)}, where
∆(s) := U∞(s)[d] − A(s)[d] is the difference between
our over-approximation and the true achievable set in
direction d.
a) We also define ∆(s, a) := U∞(s, a)[d] − A(s, a)[d]
for a state-action pair.
b) There exists some state s ∈ X with ∆(s) ≥ ∆(t) > 0.
This is true since we fixed t in Step 1, so either t ∈ X
or some state with an even larger difference.
c) Thus, X is non-empty and for all s ∈ X : ∆(s) > 0.
3) For all (s, a) exits X it holds that ∆(s, a) < ∆(s).
Reason: If (s, a) exits X , then ∃t ∈ Post(s, a)\X . Note
that ∆(t) < ∆(s).
∆(s, a) = U∞(s, a)[d]− A(s, a)[d]. (Definition of ∆)
=
∑
s′∈Post(s,a)
U∞(s
′)[d]− A(s′)[d]
(Definition of B and pulling into one sum)
< ∆(s)
(since t ∈ Post(s, a) and ∆(t) < ∆(s))
4) Fact 1: No state depends on a leaving action. Formally:
(a) ∀s ∈ X©, (s, a) exits X : A(s)[d] < A(s, a)[d],
i.e. a leaving action leaving X cannot be optimal for
Minimizer.
Reason: Since s is a state of Minimizer, U∞(s)[d] ≤
U∞(s, a)[d]. From this and the in equation from the
previous step, we get that:
U∞(s, a)[d]− A(s, a)[d]
= ∆(s, a) (Definition of ∆)
< ∆(s) (Step 3)
= U∞(s)[d]− A(s)[d] (Definition of ∆)
≤ U∞(s, a)[d]− A(s)[d] (s ∈ X©)
Subtracting U∞(s, a)[d] and multiplying by (-1)
yields the claim.
(b) ∀s ∈ X, let E := {a | a ∈ Av(s)∧ (s, a) exits X}.
Let ~w ∈ [0, 1]|Av(s)| be a vector of weights for
each action, since we need to consider all convex
combinations of exits. Let wa denote the weight
assigned to an action by some convex combination.
It holds that if for any a ∈ E : wa > 0, then
U∞(s)[d] > (
∑
a∈Av(s) wa · U∞(s, a))[d], so we
cannot use any convex combination that puts positive
weight on a leaving action. The proof is analogous to
that of the Minimizer states, expanding the definition
of evaluating a direction and then using Step 3.
5) Fact 2: If X contains an EC, then we arrive at a
contradiction.
Reason: The proof of this statement needs a lot of aux-
iliary lemmata about DEFLATE SECs and many graph
theoretic details and can be found at the end of the
Section VI-B. From the fact that X contains an EC it
shows that there is a SEC Z ⊆ X which has not
been deflated yet, and thus for all states s ∈ Z :
B(U∞(s))[d] < U∞(s)[d], which, together with the
continuity of B, is a contradiction.
6) We make a case distinction over the topology of X .
Case X does not contain an EC: Then X only contains
transient states, and there must be a bottom state s ∈
X , such that for all a ∈ Av(s) : (s, a) exits X . Since
all actions from this state are exits, it must depend on
an action leaving X , and thus by Fact 1 we arrive at
a contradiction.
Case X contains an EC: Then, by Fact 2, we arrive at a
contradiction.
7) Since in all cases we arrive at a contradiction, the
assumption that ∃t ∈ S : U∞(t) 6= A(t) was false and
the proposition follows.
VI. TECHINCAL DETAILS OF THE PROOFS
A. Soundness
Lemma 1 (Acoop for a Maximizer state is correct): If s
belongs to the Maximizer, then Acoop({s}) = A(s).
Proof: If we show that for all Maximizer states s,
Ucoop({s},A) = B(A)(s), then the lemma holds because
A = B(A) as A is a fixed point of B.
• If s is a non-target Maximizer state, then Acoop({s}) =
conv(
⋃
(s,a)∈Ex({s}) A(s, a)) = conv(
⋃
a∈Av(s) A(s, a)) =
B(A)(s). While Av(s) may contain a self-loop action
which is not contained in Ex({s}), this does not matter
as the Maximizer cannot improve its value by choosing
a self-loop action unless s is a target. Hence, adding a
A(s, a′) term, where a′ is a self-loop, to the inner union
operation does not change the result.
• If s is a target and a Maximizer state, then
Acoop({s}) = ∑s∈T r(s) + conv(⋃(s,a)∈Ex({s}) A(s, a)).
The
∑
s∈T r(s) term contributes what the self-loop would
have contributed in the Bellman equation, a value of
1 in the direction of the target s. Following a similar
reasoning as above, we can easily show that Acoop({s}) =
B(A)(s).
Lemma 2 (Ucoop for a set of states is an over-
approximation): Given an EC T , and a correct upper bound
U with U(s) ≥ A(s) for all s ∈ S , we get that ∀s ∈ T :
Ucoop(T ) ≥ A(s)
Proof: Let us introduce a new Maximizer state t rep-
resenting T . Let t be a target if T contains at least one
target. Let Av(t) = {a | (s, a) exits T}. Since t can
randomize between any set of actions that any of the states
in T can choose, ∀s ∈ T : A(t) ≥ A(s). Moreover,
∀s ∈ T©, ∃s′ ∈ T : A(s) ≤ A(s′). If this was not the
case, it means that there exists some Minimizer state s© that
has a value greater than all Maximizer states. Since T is an
EC, s© has an action a© whose successors are all in the EC.
This implies that A(s©, a©) cannot be greater that A(s′) for
all s′ ∈ T .
Using Lemma 1, we get that Acoop(T ) = Acoop({t}) =
A(t). Combining this with the previous argument yields
∀s ∈ T : Acoop(T ) ≥ A(s). Since U is correct by
assumption, it follows that ∀s ∈ T : Ucoop(T ) ≥ A(s).
Lemma 3 (GET REGIONS is sound and correct): For any
set of states T and bound function L, the set of regions R
returned by getRegions(T, L) has the following properties:
1)
⊎
R∈RR = D
2) For each R ∈ R, for all directions d ∈ D the relative
order of exits is the same. More formally: ∀d1,d2 ∈
R, s1, s2 ∈ T, i ∈ {1, 2}, ai ∈ Av(si), (si, ai) exits T :
L(s1, a1)[d1] ≥ L(s2, a2)[d1] =⇒ L(s1, a1)[d2] ≥
L(s2, a2)[d2].
Proof: That
⋃R = D follows easily from the initializa-
tion to the whole D and staying within this cone. Disjointness
follows from the definition of SC, which ensures that self-
interiors of any its two elements either do not intersect or equal
one of them. For the second claim, consider directions d1,d2
such that L(s1, a1)[d1] ≥ L(s2, a2)[d1], but L(s1, a1)[d2] <
L(s2, a2)[d2]. If the former inequality is strict, then the two
directions are split by an intersection of the frontiers of
L(s1, a1) and L(s2, a2). The intersection then splits also the
projection and thus also the produced SC and hence also the
regions. If instead equality holds, then one of the directions
is on the boundary. However, the boundary is then projected
and turned into a face of the SC, hence into a simplex, whose
parts are turned into regions. In either case, d1 and d2 lie in
different regions.
Lemma 4 (FIND SECs is sound and correct, given well
formed regions): For T ⊆ S , a lower bound function
L and a region R, where the relative ordering of exits
is the same for all directions in R, it holds that X ∈
FIND SECs(T,Av, L, R) ⇐⇒ X is an inclusion maximal
SEC with respect to L.
Proof: If a direction d is fixed, L(s)[d] ∈ R. The proof
of [KKKW18, Lemma 2] works directly. We now argue that
this is the case for all d ∈ R. Given that the relative ordering
of exits is same for all d ∈ R, for any two actions a1 and a2
L(s, a1)[d1] ≥ L(s, a2)[d1] =⇒ L(s, a1)[d2] ≥ L(s, a2)[d2].
This implies that {a ∈ Av(s) | L(s, a)[d] > L(s)[d]} is the
same for all d ∈ R. Consequently, the set B computed on
line 3 of the FIND SECs procedure is the same for all d ∈ R.
Hence, [KKKW18, Lemma 2] immediately proves this lemma
once any random d ∈ R is chosen.
Lemma 5 (DEFLATE SECs is monotonic): For any set of
states T ⊆ S and upper and lower bound functions U and
L, it holds that U′ = DEFLATE SECs(L,U, T ) is pointwise
smaller or equal than U.
Proof: For a state not part of any MEC, the upper bound is
not changed. For a state part of a MEC, U′(s) is constructed
only using intersections with U(s). Since this only restricts
the current upper bound, it can clearly be seen that U′ will be
pointwise smaller than or equal to U.
Lemma 6 (DEFLATE SECs is sound): For correct upper and
lower bound functions U and L with L(s) ≤ A(s) ≤ U(s),
for each s ∈ S , it holds that U′ = DEFLATE SECs(G, L,U)
is still correct, i.e. A(s) ≤ U′(s) for all s ∈ S .
Proof: From lines 3 - 9 of the DEFLATE SECs proce-
dure, it can be seen that the U value of a state is updated
only if it is in an inclusion maximal (see Lemma 4) SEC
X ⊆ S for some region R with respect to L. Now let s ∈ X
be a state for which the upper bound is updated. Lemmata
2 together with 5 allows us to conclude that at the end of
procedure DEFLATE SECs, A(s) ≤ U′(s) for all s ∈ S .
B. Convergence
Lemma 7 (Continuity): B is Scott-continuous.
Proof: B operates on the domain D = (Rn)S∪S×A . We
write b = (L,U) ∈ D to denote an element in this domain.
We define a partial order on D and write b1 ≤ b2 if b1 is
component-wise “worse” than b2, i.e. L1 ≤ L2 and U1 ≥ L2. A
directed chain D ∈ D is denoted as {(L1,U1), (L2,U2), . . .}.
In order to show Scott-continuity, we need to show that
for every directed chain D, unionsq(B(D)) = B(unionsq(D)) (where
unionsq is the meet). [BKW18, Proposition 8] shows that B is
Scott-continuous. Lemmata 6 and 5 show that DEFLATE is
monotonic and order-preserving. Hence, B is monotonic and
order-preserving and consequently it follows that unionsq(B(D)) =
B(unionsq(D)).
Proof of Fact 2: We have the context of the proof of
Proposition 3, in particular we know that X ⊆ S contains an
EC and that for all states s ∈ X : ∆(s) = maxs∈S ∆(s) = c.
1) Let X ′ ⊆ X be a bottom MEC in X .
Justification: We compute the MEC decomposition of X
and pick a MEC at the end of a chain. X ′ exists, since
there is an EC in X , so there also is at least one MEC
in X .
2) Let m = maxs∈X′ U(s)[d] be the maximal upper bound
in X ′.
3) Let Y := {s | s ∈ X ′ ∧ U(s) = m} be the states with
maximal upper bound in X ′.
4) ∀s ∈ Y,∃a ∈ Av(s) : ¬(s, a) exits Y , i.e. all states in Y
have actions that stay in Y .
Reasoning:
a) If for some state s ∈ Y all available actions left X ,
it would have to depend on the outside of X , and by
Fact 1 this is a contradiction. Thus s has actions that
stay in X .
b) No action can exit from Y to X \X ′, because X ′ is
a bottom MEC in X . If an action left to some state
t ∈ X \ X ′, then, since X ′ is a bottom MEC in X ,
from t there would be no reachable EC in X . Starting
from t, this is the same situation as when X does not
contain an EC, and thus Fact 1 yields a contradiction.
c) Not all actions can exit to X ′ \ Y . U(s) = m and for
every s′ ∈ X ′ \ Y : U(s′) < m. So if the action exits
Y to X ′, the upper bound of the action is smaller than
m, since part of the successors have a smaller upper
bound. It cannot have another successor with a higher
upper bound, because it has to stay in X ′, and m is
chosen to be the highest upper bound in X ′. There
has to be some action with upper bound m, because
U(s) = m. Thus, not all actions can leave to X ′.
d) Aggregating the previous points: Not all actions can
exit X , no action can exit to X \ X ′, not all actions
can exit to X ′ \ Y . So some action has to remain in
Y .
5) Let Z be a bottom MEC in Y .
Justification: We compute the MEC decomposition of X
and pick a MEC at the end of a chain. Z exists, since by
the previous step there must exists an EC in Y , since all
states have staying actions.
6) For all states s ∈ Z : A(s)[d] = m− c.
Justification: Since Z ⊆ Y , U∞(s)[d] = m Since
Y ⊆ X , ∆(s) = c. We get the following chain of equa-
tions: c = ∆(s) = U∞(s)[d] − A(s)[d] = m − A(s)[d]
Reordering yields the statement.
7) Thus, Z is an SEC for region {d}.
8) When applying B once more, Z ∈ S in Line 6 of
Algorithm 2.
Reasoning: X ′ ∈MEC(G) by definition of X ′. SoR ←
GET REGIONS(X ′, L∞) is executed. Since
⊎
R∈RR =
D by Lemma 3, there is some R ∈ R with d ∈ R. Also
by that Lemma we have that the relative order of exits for
all directions in R is the same, and since it was called
with L∞, it is correct. Thus, we can apply Lemma 4,
which proves the statement.
9) Ucoop(Z)[d] < m
Reasoning: Ucoop(Z)[d] must put positive weight on
some exit of Z. If it puts positive weight on some state-
action-pair that exits X , then by Fact 1 Ucoop(Z)[d] < m.
The only other possible exit is to X ′ \Y . This is because
of the fact the Z is a bottom MEC in Y and the
argumentation in Step 4. For all states s′ ∈ X ′ \ Y , it
holds that U(s′)[d] < m. If Ucoop(Z)[d] is constructed
from a convex combination of exits only to X ′ \ Y , then
also Ucoop(Z)[d] < m.
10) ∀s ∈ Z : B(U∞)(s)[d] = Ucoop(Z)[d]
Reasoning: Let s ∈ Z. The upper bound is modified by
only Line 9. Since d ∈ R by how the algorithm found Z
(Step 8) and since Ucoop(Z)[d] < m = U(s)[d], the new
upper bound is exactly Ucoop(Z)[d] for each s ∈ Z.
11) Thus, by combining the previous two steps, we finally
arrive at a contradiction, since ∀s ∈ Z : B(U∞)(s)[d] =
Ucoop(Z)[d] < U∞(s)[d]
VII. CONCLUSION
For a given ε > 0 and a generalized-reachability stochastic
game, we compute an ε-approximation of its Pareto frontier.
Our algorithm can be run as an anytime algorithm, reporting
the current lower and upper bounds on the frontier, due to
an extended version of value iteration. We conjecture that
this technique can be generalized to other models, such as
concurrent games, and more complex objectives, such as total
reward.
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